Trouble with selective puritanism

There is thus excessive political and selective “puritanism” in the air whose effect is an attempt to deny Kenyans their right to elect or reject “leaders”. It does not help for foreign dignitaries imply publicly that they would not want to see certain candidates elected.

The State’s ability to tackle threats depends on available strengths that range from economic and military to social and moral.

It needs institutional believability, perception of wise balancing amongst available choices, ability to create viable choices, and the penchant for escaping traps.

Amongst the worst internal threats to state is selective puritanism, especially in politics and governance, because it negates the above qualities.

External threats can be of military and non-military nature.

Military threats from relatively weak sources are easy to handle, the way the Kenya Defence Forces did by flushing out Al-Shabaab militia out of Southern Somalia.

Threats from big powers to invade little ones, however, require different response.

The weak can either appeal to the conscious of the “world” or mount guerrilla warfare in the hope of convincing the invader that it cannot win.

Non-military external threats are insidious and difficult to handle.

Few countries can defend themselves against externally induced moral decay, cyber-attacks, and subversion clothed in humanitarian garb.

This form of external attack is increasingly prevalent as big powers adopt the doctrine of legitimizing insurgency.

It smacks of colonial minded paternalism in which, presuming that voters in target states are not intelligent enough to make the right decisions, big powers choose leaders; just like “chiefs” in colonial states. Choosing leaders for countries is not new, given that US President Woodrow Wilson once vowed to “teach” Latin Americans how to elect good men. Wilson’s successors are still trying to do the same across the globe.

Internal threats tend to be structural and hard to pin down, especially when they are externally induced through the legitimising of insurgency.

They include political undertones involved in selective application of expectations. In Kenya, for instance, the real threat is not from identifiably unruly groups, it is from those masquerading as champions of constitutional “purity” as they try to derail perceived political rivals.

There is thus excessive political and selective “puritanism” in the air whose effect is an attempt to deny Kenyans their right to elect or reject “leaders”. It does not help for foreign dignitaries imply publicly that they would not want to see certain candidates elected.

The implication is that Kenyans, because selected officials supposedly know best, should not have chance to decide on political matters affecting them.