Doctrine of legitimising insurgency

Master states relate to perceived client states in peculiar ways, keep coming up with strange doctrines, and have seemingly developed one that legitimises insurgency against recalcitrant client states.

Ordinarily, countries do not entertain insurgency because it destabilises and makes it difficult for such wealth creators as farmers, artisans, and traders to produce and help build the country. Since insurgency affects more than the target country, by trans-nationalising instability, one of the international norms is to agree to live and let live.

The understanding is that various communities would not encourage or create political disturbances in the global neighbourhood. This understanding is due to experience and necessity.

For instance, after going through numerous religious wars, the Europeans adopted and sanctified this policy in 1648 at Westphalia where participants agreed on two broad things.

First, they recognised each other as “sovereigns” or sovereign territories to do as they wished within their territories. Second, they agreed that what they did outside Europe was another matter which allowed each to engage in stiff competition to grab wealth from people who were not of European extraction. The Euros dehumanised people that were not European to justify denial of rights and therefore claim that such lands were ownerless and open for Euro-grabbing.

It was to regulate that grab-mania outside Europe that they started developing the rudiments of what would become “international law” to be applied in high seas and on land. One application of this ‘international law’ thinking was in 1884-85 when representatives of Euro-powers met at Berlin to agree on how to regulate the grabbing of African land.

The territorial subdivisions that followed had such strange labels as Rhodesia, German South West Africa and German East Africa, British East Africa, Leopold’s or Belgian Congo, French West Africa. The Horn of Africa became French Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and British Somaliland.

There were several consequences of Euro-grabbing completion, mainly in Africa. DuBois argued in 1915 that it led to the Great War of 1914. As a result there was attempt to limit grab-mania and treatment of humans as commodities. This, however, did not stop the Euros from going for each other’s imperial throats in 1939.

The damage forced them to create the United Nations that tried to restore sense of humanity by declaring that no race was superior to, or had inherent right to rule, any other.

Pretensions of tolerating independence in Africa ended towards the end of the 20th Century as Euro “experts” on Africa called for the UN to remove sovereignty from African states. This was clothed in “humanitarian” jargon.

Unlike the 19th Century, Euro master states currently nullify African legitimacy with subtleness. Good at cultivating proxies who become “insurgents”, sophisticated indirect rule postmodern style, the Euros quickly endorse insurgent “grievances”.

They encourage campaigns to discredit institutions, generate civil uprisings, remove regimes, and probably install “good people” who “accept” advice. This way they implement the doctrine of legitimising insurgency in perceived client states which ipso facto delegitimises legitimate governments.

Prof Munene teaches at USIU-Africa