There is a better, cost-effective way to fight Al-Shabaab off Kenyan borders

The abduction of two Spanish MSF Doctors from the Dadaab Refugee Camp and their subsequent apparently unhindered movement across Kenya’s border by Somali terrorists would have had no impact on Kenya’s already battered economy despite being a clear violation of the country’s geographical integrity which should not be allowed to continue.

During the previous five weeks, Somali insurgents, probably Al - shabaab terrorists, attacked high end tourists’ resorts in the Lamu Archipeligo, killing an English tourist who was a well known travel writer and abducted his deaf wife back into a heavily forested costal region just across the border in Somalia; an elderly, disabled French Woman – now dead – was kidnapped by Somali terrorists from another luxury resort and taken back across the border.

These two actions constituted economic warfare occurring at the beginning of high season for tourism in the popular, albeit expensive, resorts scattered throughout the Lamu Archipeligo. Mass cancellations resulting from these attacks could easily lose Kenya in excess of $800 million in anticipated tourist revenue and deprive the resort employees of a source of income.

Nevertheless, following an all day defense council session held Friday, 14 October, the course of action chosen to demonstrate GOK resolve was to launch conventional ground troops and various air assets across the Somali border using tanks, Panhard – type light armored wheeled vehicles and lorries configured for operations usually considered administrative rather than for combat.

In addition, truck towed howitzers were also included in this offensive thrust as well as an assortment of Humvees and Land Rovers.

It should be noted, however, that the SADF continually redesigned their equipment based on lessons learned in actual combat from 1975 onwards (ie: 1989).

Missing from the parade were ambulances, fuel trucks, mobile maintenance vehicles, water bowsers and specialized command and control armored, mine – proofed vehicles.

Media reports indicate that additional tanks, armored fighting vehicles as well as additional troops and lorries loaded with supplies were being staged at Amuma on the border but will undoubtedly be delayed due to heavy rains.

Considering that the first week of operation was met with little resistance, the initial column easily advanced between 100kms and 150kms capturing three towns.

Details are sketchy but Kenya’s conventional forces have apparently been unable to advance to Afmadow due to heavy rain that has created a hostile environment for the vehicle dependent forces.

Weather conditions in the Lower Juba Operational Area are so bad that the Army cannot use parachute units or Air Calvary elements to leapfrog ahead of the now bogged down Kenyan soldiers to seize critical objectives, form stoplines or find and fix Al – Shabaab elements for destruction whether by controlled airstrikes or in direct combat with these elite troops.

Because the GOK has stated that the capture of the port town of Kismaayu is its ultimate objective, the military has apparently decided that the best way to accomplish this objective is to bring Engineer units into the operation area to facilitate crossing the Juba River and continuing its 120km motor march regardless of heavy rains, increasingly difficult terrain nearly tripling the length of its supply lines.

The logical alternative to this plan would be an amphibious assault on Kismaayu by an infantry battalion in conjunction with Air Cavalry deployments and drops of Paratroopers. Unfortunately, there is no infantry battalion trained to conduct amphibious operations and without significant improvement in the weather, air operations will remain severely restricted.

Furthermore, despite Part XIV of the Armed Forces Act (Revised Edition 1980), the GOK has failed to establish any organised reserve units whether consisting of trained personnel released from active duty or volunteer reserve formations that would have been provided appropriate military training for use in combat.

In essence, troops being sent into an apparently open – ended operation during miserable weather conditions which will invariably affect medical care, resupply of clean water and food, availability of ammunition and fuel as well the inevitable casualty evacuations, have no prospect of unit rotation and replacement by fresh personnel.

This explains the Government’s somewhat optimistic references to support from pro – TFG militia, half – trained TFG troops, reinforcement by AMISOM troops still fighting to control Mogadishu. This problem is nothing short of professional negligence and can be addressed despite the costs.

Kenya decided to launch the most expensive and militarily ineffective option available without regard for weather conditions, cost or accepted counter – insurgency doctrine.

Expensive aircraft “pounding” targets without Forward Air Controllers, may as well be tossing Dollars for all the good being done.

Unless the military has built up tremendous reserves of fuel and all manner of necessary gear, we can expect shortages of fuel for civilian use which implies even higher prices at the pump when the armed forces start to requisition Avgas and Diesel.

The immediate threat of economic warfare depriving Kenya of much needed tourist revenue will not be solved by the decision to launch a conventional, vehicle dependent assault far away from the threatened tourist resorts in the Lamu Archipeligo against Al – Shabaab insurgents. When the Kenya military withdraws from Somalia, the problem will simply return.

Adopting an updated version of the successful fire force concept used in Southern Rhodesia between 1972 and 1980, such as use of the highly trained GSU for rapid reaction to incursions from Somalia was unfortunately not considered by the Defence Council even while the proposal was being briefed at Vigilance House. Next time …?

Mr Franklin is an ex-US marine and a Nairobi-based financial consultant.