In the twilight of the five-year moratorium of the Constitution implementation, the policy makers are frenetically trying to fulfil the constitutional mandated legislative agenda.
Such agenda include formulation of legislative action to rationalise the gender-equity principle, which has evoked emotional battle of the sexes on its practicability.
Retrospectively, the idiosyncrasy of the principle that capped same gender membership of elective bodies to two-thirds of the total membership is a serious indictment of our failure to rigorously scrutinise its functionality.
Essentially, the principle was introduced as an affirmative remedy against the patriarchal proclivities that have kept women for years from holding elected and appointed offices.
Moreover, it was part of a broad political representation agenda that is exemplified in the establishment of a bicameral parliamentary system and devolution.
Undoubtedly the bicameral system has improved ratio representation to one representative to 90,000 citizens from 170,000 under the previous constitution.
However, such improvement has on the other hand increased transaction cost of building political consensus nationally and at county level.
Analogously, constitutional democracy is like a market in which representatives would compete for votes. Just as efficiency requires economic competition, responsive politics requires political competition.
In any market, the consumers’ preferences determine what and how firms produce. Similarly, in a fair and free electoral system, candidates compete to meet voters’ demand.
Such competition determines the type of public policies and how they are formulated. It is on this basis that the Constitution and electoral laws envisage a convergence of interests between voters and their elected candidates.
By setting a quota system based on a fixed ratio as the gender-equity principle proposes is likely to undermine the efficiency of voters’ right to vote for candidates of their choice.
Such interference of the convergence process may dilute the electorates’ vote by imposing an elected representative who does not represent their interest.
Inferably, the principle is premised on the convergence of gender issues. For instance, the interests of women voters are best represented by women representatives, and the same for men.
If this is true then the political representation would reflect national population gender distribution which is slightly in favour of women. Such a scenario would render the principle inconsequential.
Furthermore the assumption may easily manifest to unintended discriminatory signalling. Accordingly, fixed traits like gender signals are observable.
To illustrate, gender is an observable parameter but political representatives’ views on how they would vote on women issues are unobservable variables.
But adopting the principle may lead to errors of rejecting men representatives who are supportive of women issues or voting for women representatives who might not necessarily support women.
In conclusion, the gender-equity principle based on quota system will not likely overcome the insurmountable barrier to political competition entrenched by the patriarchal system against women.
While it would likely trigger an increase in political representation of women numerically, it will not guarantee its ultimate objective of furthering women issues substantively because of its inherent problem of discriminatory signalling.
Imposing women issues on the policy agenda demands dismantling the entry barriers to political competition by empowering women economically.
We must continue giving women economic tools to enable them lead the fight for their political rights. For the sake of inclusive growth, this we must pledge.
Prof Kieyah is the acting programmes co-ordinator at Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA). Views expressed in this article are personal.
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