Anti-corruption fight must gain from pain points House probes are revealing
Ms Josephine Kabura, a witness in the National Youth Service scandal probe, when she appeared before the parliamentary Public Accounts Committee this week. PHOTO | FILE
Since President Uhuru Kenyatta’s lamentations around the war on corruption, and subsequent queries regarding the possible loss of money in the Ministry of Health, a strange hue and cry has emerged over the “politicisation of the anti-corruption effort”.
Strange because our politics and political campaign fundraising is increasingly reliant on the proceeds of graft.
No surprise that civil society activist Boniface Mwangi observed on TV the growing number of 2017 election aspirants — 50, he claimed — already in possession of personal helicopters.
As I have said before, “digitisation” and “digital government” is an increasingly important underpinning of the enhanced accountability and transparency that’s central to the war on graft.
But, as anti-corruption expert John Githongo often notes, “you can’t digitise integrity”. Equally, there is a limit to yet more policies, more laws, more institutions or more people. So what to do?
At the State House Anti-Corruption and Accountability Summit held a fortnight ago, President Kenyatta had harsh words for the accountability actors present — EACC, DCI, DPP, Judiciary and Auditor-General. One accountability actor missing from the discourse was Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee (PAC).
This week’s PAC hearings on the National Youth Service (NYS) scam have had us all glued to our TVs in a moment of national voyeurism akin to that witnessed during the Goldenberg hearings.
The only difference is that PAC itself has appeared as enthralled as the public it serves, and this has been reflected in the often chaotic questioning mixed with interjections and points of order.
PAC’s work emanates from work performed by the Auditor-General, as is the case with NYS this week.
Today, let’s take a different route and use the work of the Auditor-General to tease out four unusual pain points we must address to win our anti-graft war in a systematic manner, digitisation notwithstanding.
Let’s begin with mega-project mania. Far more than Narc in 2003, Jubilee ascended to power in 2013 on the back of a loud change agenda detailed in its wide-ranging campaign manifesto.
In perspective, we are talking about 100 “unity”, 150 “economic” and 40 “openness” promises — total 290 pledges.
At some stage, these promises were to dovetail with Vision 2030, through the 2013-2017 medium-term plan and its multiple programmes.
Yet programming has been Jubilee’s weakest point; mega-projects prevail. Think SGR, Galana-Kulalu et al. Projects invite “off-line” financing, outside the Auditor-General’s reporting domain.
That’s where the political “fund-raising” begins. Recall Anglo-Leasing? Call this corruption pain point number one.
Let’s move into “logical government” and the public finance domain. Mega-project mania pervades the rationality of our public spending programme.
According to the Auditor-General’s reports, the Jubilee administration’s combined budget deficit (between expenditure and revenue) in its first two years was Sh1.6 trillion, equivalent to the combined budget deficit in the previous four years under the Grand Coalition Government (GCG).
The same pattern obtains in terms of actual outturns — a Sh1.3 trillion deficit in Jubilee’s first two years equals the GCG’s previous four years.
All other things (including systems) remaining constant, aggressive and profligate spending is the quickest invitation to more graft, especially when it seems so easy to finance deficits through all sorts of accessible debt. Call this corruption pain point number two.
Ifmis — the government’s computerized accounting system — has received much flak around the apparent ease with which it has been manipulated. So the “plan to budget” module looks like a “plan to eat”, the “procure to pay” module sounds like an “Authority to Initiate Eating (AIE)” and the “record to report” module signifies an “It wasn’t me” moment.
To be fair, Ifmis is designed around the widely recognised internal control principle of “segregation of duties”, which assumes zero collusion along the transaction chain. Systems don’t steal, people do.
However, let’s figure these numbers from the Auditor-General’s 2014/15 report. Total unsupported expenditure Sh7 billion. Major culprits – Agriculture Sh2.5 billion, Devolution & Planning Sh2.2 billion, Lands Sh1.3 billion.
Total wasteful (zero value for money) spending Sh14 billion. Star turns – Interior Sh4.8 billion, Agriculture Sh2 billion, Education Sh1.4 billion, Defence Sh1.1 billion.
Total pending bills –Sh43 billion. Ring leaders – Devolution & Planning Sh10 billion, Interior Sh7.2 billion, Health Sh4.8 billion, Agriculture Sh4.6 billion, Defence Sh4.2 billion, Land Sh3.7 billion, Transport & Infrastructure Sh2.5 billion, the Presidency Sh1 billion.
An unfair question — how is this happening despite investing Sh2 billion a year on Ifmis? A fair question – what more do we need to do on systems beyond Ifmis, especially on monitoring and evaluation? Call this corruption pain point number three.
The recent story on the Ministry of Health, as well as the NYS saga, remind us that fraudulent transactions are processed by people.
The Auditor-General’s report has some pretty amusing findings. For example, the Ministry of Water paying Nairobi Water Company Sh11 million for water when it has its own borehole.
Think about the Ministry of Sports paying Sh43 million to unregistered sports organisations, including an actual football club.
Or the Ministry of Environment paying Sh169 million without proof of delivery for a meteorological data collection system based on a contract awarded to one supplier in 2012, signed in 2014 but then paid in 2015 to a second supplier sub-contracted by the first supplier without official notification. Many similar examples.
Who are the people who do this stuff? The “engine room” of public service is the middle level officers in the “K to P” job group — graduate joiners to assistant directors.
As the NYS saga tells us, transactions were not processed by people in Job Group Q and above. Also, Huduma centres and e-Citizen type services have reduced corruption opportunities for Job Groups A to H.
Lacking incentives or sanctions that focus on this influential job group, it’s business as usual.
Call this corruption pain point number four. In sum, how do we fix our pain points around mega-project mania, fiscal profligacy, systems abuse and middle level officer incentives to build on the digital war on graft?
